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Varieties of Evolutionary Psychology
David J. Buller

Introduction
What is evolutionary psychology? The answer to this question is complicated by the fact that
the term “evolutionary psychology” is commonly used in two distinct senses. In one sense,
evolutionary psychology is simply the study of human behavior and psychology from an
evolutionary perspective. In this sense, evolutionary psychology is a field of inquiry, a loose
confederation of research programs that differ significantly in theoretical and methodological
commitments. These diverse research programs attempt to explain a wide variety of
phenomena, ranging from foraging and birth spacing in traditional hunter-gatherer societies to
encephalization (the progressive increase in brain size relative to body size in the human
lineage) and the evolution of altruism and language. What unites these research programs is not
a shared commitment to specific theories regarding the evolution of human behavior and
psychology, but only a commitment to articulating questions about human behavior and
psychology, and articulating answers to those questions, with conceptual and theoretical tools
drawn from evolutionary theory.
In this broad sense, evolutionary psychology dates back to Darwin’s The Descent of Man
(published in 1871) and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (published in 1872).
But, despite Darwin’s early efforts, there was relatively little concerted study of human
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behavior and psychology from an evolutionary perspective until the latter half of the twentieth
century, when several research programs emerged and attracted significant numbers of
researchers (Laland and Brown 2002). The earliest of these research programs was human
ethology, exemplified by Konrad Lorenz’s 1963 book On Aggression. The field really took off,
however, with the emergence of human sociobiology in the 1970s, and in the ensuing decade
additional research programs emerged known as evolutionary anthropology and human behavioral
ecology. These research programs differ in the methods by which they apply evolutionary theory
to the study of human behavior and psychology, and they differ in their theoretical accounts of
how evolution has affected the human mind. Nonetheless, in the broad sense of the term,
“evolutionary psychology” encompasses all of these research programs.
In a narrower sense, the term “evolutionary psychology” often designates just a specific
research program within the field of evolutionary psychology, the foremost theoreticians of which
are the anthropologists John Tooby and Donald Symons and the psychologists Leda Cosmides
and David Buss. This group of researchers is united in the belief that adoption of an
evolutionary perspective on human psychology immediately entails a number of very specific
theoretical and methodological doctrines, and often the term “evolutionary psychology”
specifically refers to this set of doctrines. So as to clearly distinguish the field of inquiry from
the specific research program, I will refer to the field of inquiry as “evolutionary psychology”
(in lower case) and the research program as “Evolutionary Psychology” (capitalized).
Since its emergence in the late 1980s, Evolutionary Psychology has become the single
most dominant research program in the field of evolutionary psychology, having garnered the
lion’s share of attention both within academia and throughout the popular media. But there is
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more to evolutionary psychology than Evolutionary Psychology. In particular, while
Evolutionary Psychology has occupied the limelight, human behavioral ecology has quietly
become a vibrant research program with impressive credentials. Indeed, it is the strongest rival
to Evolutionary Psychology within the field of evolutionary psychology. In this chapter, I strive
to give some sense of the diversity of research in evolutionary psychology by comparing and
contrasting the theoretical and methodological principles of Evolutionary Psychology and
human behavioral ecology. Both of these research programs, however, grew out of human
sociobiology, so that is where we will begin.

Human Sociobiology
Although many researchers have contributed to the program of human sociobiology, without
doubt its leading theoretician has been Edward O. Wilson. In the mid-1970s, Wilson published
several works that showcased numerous applications of evolutionary theory to the explanation
of animal behavior and that articulated a theoretical framework within which to view them.
Wilson called this framework sociobiology, which he defined simply as “the extension of
population biology and evolutionary theory to social organization” (1978, x). Wilson further
argued that the very principles that successfully explain the social organization of bee hives and
dominance hierarchies in spider monkeys could be extended to human social behavior as well.
This extension of sociobiology to human behavior became known as human sociobiology, and
Wilson conceived it as the study of the biological basis of human social behavior.
The core idea of Wilson’s sociobiology was that behavior has evolved under natural and
sexual selection just as aspects of organic form have. Evolution by natural or sexual selection
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occurs when organisms in a population exhibit phenotypic variation, that variation is heritable,
and organisms with one of the phenotypic variants are, on average, better adapted to their
environment than organisms with the alternative phenotypes. When these conditions are met,
selection causes the better-adapted phenotype to increase in frequency in the population, and
the population as a whole becomes better adapted to its environment. Over very long stretches
of time, selection has this effect on many different phenotypes, and populations thereby become
well adapted to the environments they inhabit. The simple idea at the foundation of Wilson’s
program was that these explanatory principles are applicable to behavioral, not just
morphological and physiological, phenotypes. For example, females of many species choose a
mate based on the quality of male courtship displays. If males’ courtship displays vary in
quality, and that variation is heritable, then sexual selection will cause the superior display to
increase in frequency, and males will become behaviorally adapted to female preference. In this
way, selection can shape the way that organisms behave just as it shapes their bodies.
This simple idea has two important corollaries. First, it entails that behaviors that have
been shaped by selection are adaptations. Thus, just as organisms in a population possess
anatomical adaptations, they possess behavioral adaptations as well. Accordingly, part of
Wilson’s program was an effort to provide adaptationist explanations of how certain forms of
behavior evolved. Second, since selection has shaped behavior to the environment in which it
occurs, and since an organism’s total environment includes its social environment, Wilson’s
simple idea entails that some behaviors are adaptations to social life. Accordingly, Wilson’s
program was principally concerned with explaining how individuals in a population are
behaviorally adapted to social life with one another—explaining behavioral adaptations for

5
dominance hierarchies, for manifesting and dealing with aggression, and for mating. Indeed,
Wilson took the central theoretical problem of his program to be explaining the evolution of
altruism—explaining why so many organisms have evolved to perform acts that benefit other
organisms at a cost to themselves.
To illustrate these aspects of Wilson’s program of human sociobiology, consider sex
differences in human mating behavior. Both sexes need to reproduce in order to be successful in
the evolutionary long haul, but reproduction entails very different costs for the two sexes. In
order to produce a single child, a woman must invest one of her very limited number of eggs,
physiological resources for a nine-month gestation, and the metabolic costs of lactation (often
lasting two or three years). Moreover, during pregnancy and lactation, a woman is unable to
reproduce with males other than—and possibly better than—the father of her child. In contrast,
in order to produce a single child, a male need only invest the energy expended in copulation
and the contents of a single ejaculate. After a fruitful copulation, a man can reproduce with
other women, whereas a woman is committed to the costly act of childbearing. This is a radical
asymmetry in the minimum obligatory parental investment required of the sexes in order to
produce a single offspring: Women are obligated to a far higher investment in offspring than
are men. Given this asymmetry, selection should have made women very choosy when
selecting a mate, since they have to invest a great deal in a single offspring and, hence, have a
great deal to lose by choosing a poor sire. In contrast, since men incur such a minimal obligation
in order to produce an offspring, and since they can (theoretically) impregnate innumerable
numbers of women during the time it takes a woman to bear one man’s child, selection should
have made men indiscriminately promiscuous. As Wilson says, selection should have created
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“males to be aggressive, hasty, fickle, and undiscriminating,” and “females to be coy” (1978,
125). In other words, in humans, male promiscuity and female coyness are behavioral
adaptations.

Evolutionary Psychology
The starting point of Evolutionary Psychology is a corrective to the core idea of Wilson’s
sociobiology. Evolutionary Psychologists argue that treating behavioral phenotypes just like
morphological and physiological phenotypes obscures a fundamental difference between them.
For behaviors are events, which are the output of an information-processing brain reacting to
informational input about the current conditions in both the environment and the brain itself.
The only way that selection can affect behavior, then, is by altering the information-processing
structure of the brain (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). So, when a behavior has evolved under
selection, there is an important sense in which it is not the behavior itself that has been selected
for, but rather the psychological mechanism (cognitive or motivational) that is causally responsible
for producing that behavior under appropriate conditions. Since behavioral evolution involves
selection for the psychological mechanisms that cause behavior, the adaptations that emerge in
the process of behavioral evolution are the psychological mechanisms that cause behavior.
Consequently, Evolutionary Psychologists conclude, sociobiology was mistaken in seeking
adaptation at the level of behavior; adaptation must be sought at the level of the psychological
mechanism (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). The goal of Evolutionary Psychology is thus to
discover and describe the information-processing structure of our psychological adaptations
(Buss 1995).
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From this starting point, Evolutionary Psychologists derive a number of theoretical and
methodological doctrines. First, they argue, our psychological adaptations are undoubtedly
complex, and the construction of complex adaptations typically requires hundreds of thousands
of years of cumulative selection. Our ancestors spent the Pleistocene—the epoch spanning 1.8
million to 10,000 years ago—living in small hunter-gatherer groups, but only the past 10,000
years living as agriculturists and the past few hundred years living in industrial societies.
Consequently, it is highly improbable that humans have evolved adaptations to postPleistocene environments. Rather, Evolutionary Psychologists argue, our psychological
adaptations must have been designed during the Pleistocene to solve the adaptive problems
faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors (Symons 1992). As Cosmides and Tooby colorfully put
it, “our modern skulls house a Stone Age mind” (1997, 85).
Adaptive problems are commonly characterized as problems whose solutions enhance
the ability to survive or reproduce. And the adaptive problems faced by our Pleistocene
ancestors ranged from acquiring mates and forming social alliances to avoiding predators and
inedible flora. These problems are very diverse in character, and each requires a unique
behavioral solution; a successful behavioral solution to one problem would not have transferred
to another. Thus, Evolutionary Psychologists argue, each adaptive problem would have selected
for its own dedicated problem-solving psychological mechanism (Symons 1992). Moreover,
since our Pleistocene ancestors faced such an enormous variety of adaptive problems, Cosmides
and Tooby conclude that “the brain must be composed of a large collection of circuits, with
different circuits specialized for solving different problems. One can think of each specialized
circuit as a minicomputer that is dedicated to solving one problem. Such dedicated
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minicomputers are sometimes called modules” (1997, 81). Indeed, Cosmides and Tooby estimate
that the human mind contains hundreds or thousands of such modules, and this view has
accordingly been dubbed the massive modularity thesis.
According to Evolutionary Psychologists, evolved modules have the following
properties (Cosmides and Tooby 1997; Tooby & Cosmides 1992). First, they are domain specific,
specialized to deal only with a restricted task domain. As such, their information-processing
procedures are activated by, and sensitive to, only information about a particular aspect of the
world, in much the way the ear is responsive only to specific vibratory frequencies. Second,
they come equipped with substantial innate knowledge about their proprietary problem
domains and with a set of innate procedures specialized in employing that knowledge to solve
problems in their domains. And, third, they develop reliably, and without formal instruction in
their problem domains, in every “normal” member of our species.
Since evolved modules are complex adaptations, and since “selection usually tends to
make complex adaptations universal or nearly universal in a species,” Evolutionary
Psychologists argue that “humans must share a complex, species-typical and species-specific
architecture of adaptations” (Tooby and Cosmides 1992, 38). Indeed, Evolutionary
Psychologists believe that evolved psychological modules constitute a “universal and uniform
human nature” (Tooby and Cosmides 1992, 79). Accordingly, Evolutionary Psychologists
interpret differences between individuals within the same culture, and differences between
individuals in different cultures, as “the product of a common, underlying evolved psychology
operating under different environmental circumstances” (Tooby and Cosmides 1992, 45).
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However, because our network of modules—our universal human nature—evolved to
solve the adaptive problems faced by our Pleistocene ancestors, and because the environments
we now inhabit differ enormously from those inhabited by our Pleistocene ancestors,
Evolutionary Psychologists argue that our evolved modules often fail to produce adaptive
behavior among modern humans. For example, fear evolved as an emotional alarm that signals
a threat to survival. But, since human fears evolved during the Pleistocene, humans tend to fear
snakes but not cars and guns, despite the fact that more people are killed by cars and guns than
by snakes. In addition, people in modern industrialized societies could maximize their
reproductive success by donating their sperm or eggs to cryobanks, but very few people pursue
this reproductive option. The reason is that this option wasn’t available in the Pleistocene, and
we have minds designed to maximize reproductive success only under Pleistocene-like
conditions, in which reproductive success was achieved only through the pursuit of copulation.
Because of this mismatch between human nature and contemporary human environments,
Symons argues that the study of whether contemporary human behavior is adaptive will
“rarely shed light on human nature or the selective forces that shaped that nature” (1992, 146).
Thus, Evolutionary Psychologists claim, in order to discover the evolved design of the mind, we
must “reverse engineer” the mind from the vantage of our evolutionary past.
The method by which Evolutionary Psychologists propose to reverse engineer the
evolved structure of the mind is evolutionary functional analysis (Tooby and Cosmides 1992; Buss
1995). Evolutionary functional analysis begins with the specification of an adaptive problem
that Pleistocene humans presumably faced. That adaptive problem is then analyzed into a
number of subproblems whose solutions collectively constitute a solution to the adaptive
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problem. (For example, Pleistocene-era males faced the problem of intrasexual competition for
reproductive access to females, and solving this problem presumably required solving the
subproblems of acquiring the resources desired by females, successfully courting females, and
retaining mates, among other things.) The next step is to determine what forms of behavior
would have constituted adaptive solutions under Pleistocene conditions to these subproblems.
A module is then postulated, which is assumed to have evolved to generate solutions to all of
these subproblems. The final step is to determine the information-processing procedures by
which the module generates its behavioral solution(s) from its inputs. Evolutionary
Psychologists then conduct standard psychological experiments in order to determine whether
people behave in ways predicted by the modular hypothesis generated in these last two steps.
Evolutionary Psychologists claim to have made many discoveries regarding the evolved
nature of the mind by employing this method. Consider just one example by way of illustration.
Throughout our evolution as Pleistocene hunter-gatherers, men invested resources (food,
protection, and paternal care) in the offspring of their mates. But, because ovulation is
concealed and fertilization occurs internally in our species, a Pleistocene human male could
never be 100 percent certain when he was likely to impregnate his mate or, if his mate was
pregnant, whether it was he who had impregnated her. This posed the following problem for an
ancestral male: If his mate was surreptitiously unfaithful, a man could waste his resources on a
child that wasn’t his own. Pleistocene human women, in contrast, were always 100 percent
certain that offspring born to them were their own. An ancestral woman’s problem was that an
infidelity by her mate could lead to his falling in love with another woman, abandoning her,
and withdrawing the resources on which she depended to successfully rear her children.
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Evolutionary Psychologists argue that jealousy evolved as an emotional alarm to protect against
these respective potential losses due to a mate’s infidelity. However, since the threats posed by
infidelity were different for the sexes, Evolutionary Psychologists argue, males and females
must have evolved different psychological mechanisms: “the inputs that activate jealousy for
men will focus heavily on the sex act per se, whereas for women they will focus on cues to the
loss of the men’s commitment and investment” (Buss 1995, 14). Evolutionary Psychologists
have conducted numerous studies to test this prediction, and they claim that it is confirmed by
the evidence (Buss 1995, 14-15). Thus, they conclude, men and women have evolved distinct
psychological adaptations for monitoring, and emotionally responding to, cues of potential
infidelity.

Human Behavioral Ecology
Whereas Evolutionary Psychology is an attempt to blend evolutionary theory with cognitive
psychology, human behavioral ecology derives from the branch of biology known as behavioral
ecology. Behavioral ecology is the study of how animal behavior is adaptively responsive to
conditions in animals’ physical and social environments. The fundamental premise of
behavioral ecology is that “animals are maximizers of one sort or another—efficient predators
or foragers, or elusive prey. The usual ground for believing this is the presumption that natural
selection has made them so” (Grafen 1991, 5). Behavioral ecologists view animals as behaving so
as to maximize their shares of a variety of “currencies” that are correlated with survival and
reproductive success. These evolutionarily significant “currencies” include caloric intake,
offspring survivability, clutch size, territory, number of copulations, quality of mate, number of
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sperm in an inseminate, number of inseminates “harvested” per fertile period, and number of
mates per fertile period. Behavioral ecologists presuppose that animals tend to adopt behavioral
strategies that enable them to maximize these “currencies” in the particular environmental
conditions in which they find themselves. And this presupposition, in turn, entails that animals
are capable of behaving adaptively across a very wide range of ecological conditions, flexibly
altering their behavior in response to current conditions in order to maximize their chances of
survival and reproductive success.
Behavioral ecologists study animal behavior with optimality models and evolutionary
game theoretic models. Such models begin with the specification of some currency whose
maximization is to be studied. For example, a model may study “clutch size” (that is, number of
offspring born and cared for at the same time) in some species of bird. The models then identify
a number of alternative strategies that animals may pursue by way of attempting to maximize
that currency. If the currency is clutch size, the alternative strategies would be various clutch
sizes: one strategy would be to have two chicks, another would be to have three, and so on. The
models then identify the costs and benefits associated with each of the available strategies. In the
case of clutch size, the benefits of the alternative strategies are easily measured in terms of
number of offspring reared to reproductive viability. Accordingly, benefits appear to increase
with increasing clutch sizes. However, offspring need to be fed and cared for, and those
activities exact a high cost in parental energy; indeed, the greater the number of fledglings, the
more food that needs to be captured and returned to the nest. Moreover, if clutch size gets too
large, parents can’t adequately provide for all the chicks in the brood, and fledgling mortality
increases. So there are also costs associated with each strategy (each clutch size). Behavioral
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ecologists calculate the costs and benefits of each strategy in order to determine which of the
available strategies maximizes the average ratio of benefits to costs—that is, in order to
determine which is the optimal strategy. For example, behavioral ecologists may predict that,
for a particular species of bird, five fledglings is the optimal clutch size. They then predict that
the studied animals will pursue that optimal strategy, and they test their prediction against the
actual behavior in a population of the studied species.
There are two things to note about modeling in behavioral ecology. First, the particular
costs and benefits associated with a particular behavioral strategy depend heavily on the
specific features of the environment in which that strategy is pursued. In an environment in
which food is scarce and difficult to obtain the optimal clutch size will be smaller than in an
environment in which food is abundant and easily obtainable. Thus, predictions regarding the
optimal strategy in a population are always relative to the particular environment inhabited by
the population. Second, although sometimes an animal’s optimal strategy is independent of the
strategies of other population members, at other times it is not. For example, for many animals
there is an optimal amount of time spent foraging for food, which maximizes the energy intake
per unit of foraging time, and this optimum is independent of how long other population
members spend foraging. However, when population members directly compete with one
another for resources (including members of the opposite sex, who are reproductive resources),
the optimal strategy for any particular population member will depend on the strategies of
other population members. If most males competing for territory only engage in threatening
displays and retreat when attacked, a tactic of extreme aggression may be greatly beneficial.
But, if most males are extremely aggressive, then aggression could entail the costs of injury or
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death. So the costs and benefits of a behavioral strategy in a competition depend on the
strategies adopted by other population members. In such cases, a population may be
characterized by an evolutionarily stable ratio of alternative behavioral strategies.
When behavioral ecologists find that animals are, in fact, pursuing the strategy
predicted by an optimality or evolutionary game theoretic model, they are confident that their
model has correctly identified the selective forces in the environment to which animal behavior
is responsive and the cost-benefit structures of the available alternative strategies in that
environment. However, if animal behavior fails to conform to the predicted optimal strategy,
behavioral ecologists assume that the model needs to be revised. Models can be revised by
altering the set of strategies assumed to be available to the population or by changing the costs
and benefits associated with the strategies in the set. But, when a model fails to accurately
predict behavioral strategies, behavioral ecologists typically assume that the model has failed to
include some variables to which animals are responding in “choosing” a behavioral strategy. In
particular, behavioral ecologists typically assume that the studied animals are not pursuing the
predicted strategy because of a tradeoff among competing life demands. The assumption is that
the need to maximize another currency places constraints on the ways in which population
members can pursue maximization of the currency in the model.
In fact, for the typical animal, life is little more than a series of tradeoffs (Laland and
Brown 2002, 117-118). In very general terms, animals face a tradeoff between somatic effort
(effort expended toward bodily growth and maintenance) and reproductive effort. Within the
category of reproductive effort, there is a tradeoff between mating effort (effort expended to
increase the number of offspring) and parenting effort (effort expended to care for already
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produced offspring). And, within the category of parenting effort, parents of two or more
offspring face a tradeoff between caring for one offspring and caring for another. Accordingly,
when animal behavior fails to conform to the predictions of a model, behavioral ecologists
typically assume that the animals are trying to simultaneously maximize several currencies and
that efforts to maximize one currency place constraints on efforts to maximize another. “Unlike
a robot designed to excel at sweeping or stamping,” behavioral ecologists believe, “natural
selection is unlikely to design organisms to maximize outputs of any particular task; rather,
selection should favor organisms that optimize these abilities (trade off amounts and efficiencies
in each), thus maximizing their chances of surviving and reproducing” (Smith, Borgerhoff
Mulder, and Hill 2001, 130). Thus, the presupposition underlying modeling in behavioral
ecology is that selection has designed animals to achieve an optimal allocation of effort among
competing life demands. In the ideal limit, then, behavioral ecology aims to provide a set of
interconnected models showing how animal behavior strikes the optimal compromise in
pursuing all evolutionarily significant currencies.
Human behavioral ecology is simply the application of these ideas to humans, and it
thereby involves several theoretical commitments regarding human behavior. First, human
behavioral ecology assumes that human decision making is flexibly responsive to current
environmental conditions, resulting in the choice of behavioral strategies that will optimize the
allocation of effort among competing life demands and maximize lifetime reproductive output
relative to the constraints imposed by the environment (Borgerhoff Mulder 1991, 70). As a
result, second, human behavioral ecology sees behavioral differences between individuals as
adaptive responses to differing environmental conditions. Human behavioral ecology thus
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seeks “to determine how ecological and social factors affect behavioural variability within and
between populations” (Borgerhoff Mulder 1991, 69). Accordingly, human behavioral ecologists
often interpret human behavior as the result of conditional strategies, behavioral strategies of the
form “In environmental conditions A, do x; in conditions B, do y; in conditions C, do z” (Smith,
Borgerhoff Mulder, and Hill 2001, 128). Third, human behavioral ecologists assume that human
behavior is adaptive across a very wide range of environmental conditions, including many
environmental conditions to which our species was never exposed during its evolutionary
history. Thus, whereas Evolutionary Psychology expects human behavior to be frequently
maladaptive in contemporary environments (because evolution in our psychological
adaptations is lagging behind the rapid changes in post-Pleistocene human environments),
human behavioral ecology expects human behavior “to be well-adapted to most features of
contemporary environments, and to exhibit relatively little adaptive lag” (Smith 2000, 30).
In addition, human behavioral ecologists believe that adaptive behavioral responses can
be produced and reproduced by a variety of different mechanisms. The same adaptive behavior
could be achieved by one individual through the output of an innate module, but by another
individual as the result of domain-general learning. Moreover, the same adaptive behavior
could be genetically transmitted across generations through genes for modules or learning
biases, through direct teaching by others, or through indirect cultural transfer of learnable
information. Since adaptive behavior can be achieved through a variety of different
mechanisms, human behavioral ecologists adopt a methodological strategy known as the
phenotypic gambit: They ignore details about underlying mechanisms (which are typically not
known anyway) in the belief that these details won’t matter with respect to understanding
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human behavior. That is, human behavioral ecologists believe that a focus on evolutionarily
significant ecological conditions, and the adaptive demands these place on humans, will enable
them to understand why humans behave as they do even in the absence of knowledge of the
mechanisms responsible for producing that behavior (which, in any case, may vary from one
individual to another). Thus, human behavioral ecologists are “generally agnostic about
mechanisms (including the question of cognitive modularity)” (Smith 2000, 30).
To illustrate these principles of human behavioral ecology, consider the phenomenon of
polyandry, a marital system in which one woman has more than one husband. Nearly all
systems of marriage in ethnographically recorded human societies are either monogamous or
polygynous (in which one man has more than one wife). But, of 849 recorded societies,
polyandry is practiced in 4, all of which are located in the Himalayan highlands (Borgerhoff
Mulder 1991, 82). At first glance, polyandry appears to defy evolutionary logic. For a woman’s
lifetime reproductive output is limited by the number of pregnancies she can carry to term,
whereas a man’s lifetime reproductive output is limited only by the number of women he can
impregnate. At the theoretical limit, a woman can achieve her maximum reproductive output
with a single mate, whereas a man can achieve his maximum reproductive output only with
multiple mates. Thus, polyandry appears to entail no reproductive benefits for women, while
involving a vastly suboptimal reproductive arrangement for men. From an evolutionary costbenefit standpoint, polygyny would appear to provide the greatest benefits for men, while
nonetheless allowing women to achieve their maximum lifetime reproductive output. So why
would men ever agree to enter a polyandrous marriage?
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Human behavioral ecologists study polyandrous populations with an eye to
understanding the ecological factors that may make polyandry an adaptive choice, and they
have identified several ecological factors that may affect the cost-benefit calculations in the
decision making of those who enter polyandrous marriages. Human behavioral ecologists have
discovered that polyandrous marriages are typically fraternal—that is, marriages in which one
woman is married to two or more brothers. This helps, in part, to offset the costs of polyandry
to the co-husbands, since their resources are pooled to rear only offspring to which they are all
genetically related. Moreover, human behavioral ecologists have also discovered that polyandry
typically occurs among brothers who have inherited farm land that is too small to be divided
into parcels that could each sustain a family. In addition, farming the inherited land is highly
labor intensive, so that no one of the brothers could successfully cultivate it in order to support
a family. Finally, where polyandrous marriages occur, there aren’t alternative sources of income
available to the brothers; cultivating the family farm is the only available means of subsistence.
Thus, human behavioral ecologists have concluded, polyandry pays brothers under such
circumstances, since they do better by maintaining joint possession of the farm, working it
together, marrying one woman, and rearing their joint offspring than they would do by trying
to go their own ways (Borgerhoff Mulder 1991, 84). As further confirmation of this hypothesis,
human behavioral ecologists have discovered that when alternative sources of income sufficient
to raise a family became available, younger brothers typically leave their polyandrous
marriages in order to start a family of their own (Laland and Brown 2002, 123-124). Human
behavioral ecologists therefore believe that polyandry is an adaptive marriage system in the
ecological conditions of those who choose it.
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Complementary Research Programs or Competing Paradigms?
There are several apparent differences between Evolutionary Psychology and human
behavioral ecology (summarized in table 1). First, whereas Evolutionary Psychology strives to
discover psychological adaptations to Pleistocene environments, human behavioral ecology
studies human behavior and how it is adaptively responsive to ecological conditions. Second,
Evolutionary Psychology expects human behavior to be frequently maladaptive in
contemporary environments, because of adaptive lag in psychological evolution, while human
behavioral ecology expects human behavior to be fairly well adapted to contemporary
environments. Accordingly, third, Evolutionary Psychology believes that the evolved nature of
the human mind must be “reverse engineered” from the vantage of our species’ Pleistocene
past, whereas human behavioral ecology believes that evolutionary principles can be applied in
studying human behavior in contemporary environments. Fourth, whereas Evolutionary
Psychology postulates that human behavior is caused by hundreds or thousands of modules,
which are special-purpose minicomputers adapted to specific adaptive problems faced by our
Pleistocene ancestors, human behavioral ecology is agnostic about the nature and number of
psychological mechanisms that are causally responsible for adaptive human behavior. Finally,
Evolutionary Psychology strives to discover a universal human nature underlying behavioral
differences between cultures and between individuals in the same culture, whereas human
behavioral ecology studies how environmental differences between individuals affect
behavioral differences between them.
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Some have argued that these differences between Evolutionary Psychology and human
behavioral ecology are more a matter of explanatory emphasis than substantive scientific
disagreement (Smith 2000, 33-36; Laland and Brown 2002, chap. 8). According to this
ecumenical view, Evolutionary Psychology is simply the investigation of the psychological
mechanisms about which human behavioral ecology remains agnostic in its focus on behavior.
Whereas human behavioral ecology studies the behavioral “outside” of the human organism,
Evolutionary Psychology studies the behaviorally generative psychological “inside.” So, while
human behavioral ecology aspires to explain how our behavior is adaptively responsive to our
ecological conditions, Evolutionary Psychology aspires to explain how our psychological
adaptations cause that behavior. Similarly, the argument goes, human behavioral ecology seeks
to explain how variation in ecological conditions affects behavioral variation both within and
between populations, whereas Evolutionary Psychology seeks to explain how this behavioral
variation is caused by a universal human nature responding differentially to differing
environmental conditions. Thus, it is possible to see Evolutionary Psychology and human
behavioral ecology as offering complementary, rather than competing, explanations.
But the ecumenical position greatly exaggerates the extent to which the two research
programs are compatible. For, while human behavioral ecology is compatible with some
evolutionary account of the mechanisms underlying the behavior it studies, it isn’t compatible
with Evolutionary Psychology’s account of those mechanisms.
To see why, reconsider Evolutionary Psychology’s massive modularity hypothesis.
According to this hypothesis, each adaptive problem our lineage faced in its Pleistocene past
was solved by a dedicated module; adaptive behavior was achieved in each problem domain by
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an “expert system,” which was designed to achieve adaptive performance in its problem
domain, but was ineffective outside of its area of expertise. Indeed, Evolutionary Psychologists
claim, humans often fail to behave adaptively in contemporary environments because modules,
with their “tunnel cognition,” are incapable of functioning effectively when not encountering
precisely the conditions for which they were designed.
This contrasts sharply with human behavioral ecology’s presupposition that humans
can flexibly alter their behavioral strategies so as to strike optimal tradeoffs among numerous
adaptive problems. According to human behavioral ecologists, “effective adaptive design
requires integrative mechanisms for measuring tradeoffs (which themselves vary in complex
and contingent ways), and adjusting behavior according to the weighted effect of different
activities” on reproductive success (Smith, Borgerhoff Mulder, and Hill 2001, 130-131). But,
since the problem of striking the optimal tradeoff across adaptive problem domains is not a
problem in any of those domains, no domain-specific module could weigh the costs and
benefits of alternative tradeoff strategies and adjust behavior accordingly. Such strategic
tradeoffs could be struck only by some domain-general psychological mechanism. Moreover, that
domain-general mechanism could not simply be a mechanism that turned on and off the
various modules that are relevant to one’s circumstances, leaving the modules to solve their
own problems in their own ways. It would have to be a domain-general mechanism that could
adjust behavior within each adaptive problem domain in a way that allowed for the optimal
allocation of effort and efficiencies among competing demands. But, any psychological
mechanism capable of adjusting behavior within problem domains so as to strike optimal
tradeoffs would not need to be supplemented with mechanisms that are specialized for
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functions within each problem domain. Thus, although human behavioral ecology’s
presupposition that humans can flexibly alter behavior so as to optimize tradeoffs is compatible
with some account of the psychological mechanisms that make such adaptive tradeoffs possible,
it’s not compatible with Evolutionary Psychology’s massive modularity hypothesis. If human
behavioral ecology is right about the flexible adaptiveness of human behavior, Evolutionary
Psychology is wrong about the psychological mechanisms underlying that behavior.
This substantive difference between the two research programs is related to another
difference, which Evolutionary Psychologists have taken to be substantive, but which is only
partly so. Because human behavioral ecology seeks to explain adaptive human behavior, while
remaining agnostic about the psychological adaptations underlying that behavior, Evolutionary
Psychologists have often claimed that it is not a genuinely evolutionary theory of human
behavior. According to Evolutionary Psychologists, the theory of evolution by natural selection
is a theory of adaptation, so “nothing in the theory of evolution by natural selection justifies an
adaptation-agnostic science of adaptiveness” (Symons 1992, 150). Since Evolutionary
Psychology’s goal is to discover human psychological adaptations, it claims to be the only truly
evolutionary theory of human behavior and psychology.
But human behavioral ecology is not agnostic as to whether adaptations underlie the
adaptive behavior it studies. Indeed, human behavioral ecologists assume that “human
decisions are guided by complex processes of observation, evaluation, recalled experience,
experimentation and strategizing which . . . have themselves been shaped by past selection
pressures” (Borgerhoff Mulder 1991, 70). In this respect, human behavioral ecologists are no
more agnostic about adaptations than Evolutionary Psychologists. Human behavioral ecology
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merely refuses to commit itself to hypotheses regarding the precise causal mechanisms
comprising the adaptations that underlie adaptive human behavior. There are two reasons for
this restraint, and these reasons substantively differentiate human behavioral ecology from
Evolutionary Psychology.
First, human behavioral ecologists believe that the best way to discover human
psychological adaptations is to study the ways in which humans respond adaptively to their
ecological conditions rather than to attempt to “reverse engineer” them from the vantage of our
Pleistocene past (Smith, Borgerhoff Mulder, and Hill 2001, 131-132). Thus, we will achieve
knowledge of the adaptations underlying human behavior only after we understand the actual
decisions humans make regarding survival and reproduction. Second, the belief that humans
can flexibly alter their behavior, so as to behave adaptively even in evolutionarily novel
environments, presupposes that human psychological adaptations are mechanisms of adaptive
plasticity (in which a single genotype produces more than one phenotype by responding
appropriately to environmental conditions). Since mechanisms of adaptive plasticity are not yet
well understood, human behavioral ecologists currently treat them as “black boxes” in their
studies of human behavior. But, whatever the details about the causal workings inside such
black boxes, mechanisms of adaptive plasticity contrast sharply with Evolutionary Psychology’s
modules, which are functionally specialized to produce particular forms of behavior and which
develop reliably across a broad range of environmental conditions. Consequently, while human
behavioral ecology doesn’t presuppose hypotheses about specific psychological adaptations, it
differs from Evolutionary Psychology regarding the kinds of adaptation that underlie human
behavior.
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Thus, although human behavioral ecology can be fruitfully supplemented with
explanations of the nature and evolution of the psychological mechanisms underlying adaptive
human behavior, its theoretical commitments preclude being conjoined with the particular
explanations that Evolutionary Psychology offers. Despite some superficial complementarities,
human behavioral ecology and Evolutionary Psychology are actually competing paradigms
rather than complementary research programs. As the theoretical and empirical fortunes of one
program wane, those of the other will wax.

Conclusion
The widely popularized research program of Evolutionary Psychology is not the only game on
the field of evolutionary psychology. Indeed, human behavioral ecology is a vibrant alternative
paradigm for understanding human behavior from an evolutionary perspective. And, since
much recent research has detailed numerous problems with the theory and methodology of
Evolutionary Psychology (see, for example, Buller 2005), human behavioral ecology is the
paradigm that holds the greatest promise for the future of evolutionary psychology.

Table 1 Comparison of Evolutionary Psychology and human behavioral ecology
Evolutionary Psychology

human behavioral ecology

What is evolutionary theory
employed to explain?

psychological adaptations

adaptive behavioral strategies

Is contemporary human
behavior generally adaptive?

no

yes

From what vantage point are
evolutionary principles
applied?

our Pleistocene past

the present

Committed to massive
modularity?

yes

no

Committed to a universal
human nature?

yes

no
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